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ARISTOTLE AND CONGRESS
JERROLD G. VAN CISE*

"It is best to have property private," according to Aristotle. In this
manner, "industry will be increased, as each person will labor to improve
his own private property." But it is also best to have the state "composed
as much as possible of equals," he adds, because the "very rich" know not
how to obey and the "very poor" know not how to command. Not surprisingly, therefore, he urged that "some boundary should be set to riches."'
These Aristotelian principles are reflected in our antitrust laws. Thereunder, property is to remain private, but certain limits are imposed upon
concentration of wealth. In particular, Congress sought to place "some
boundary" upon the concentration of wealth achieved by corporations
through acquisitions and mergers. Accordingly, any study of the application
of these laws to corporate acquisitions and mergers might commence with a
review of the reasons which led Congress to adopt this legislation.
THE SHERMAN ACT

The Sherman Act,2 enacted in 1890, limits the accumulation of wealth
by private persons where such growth is achieved through an unreasonable
restraint or monopolization of interstate and foreign commerce. Its provisions apply equally to internal and to external growth, as well as to
individuals and corporations.
At the time that this Act was passed, it was feared that the trust and
other forms of industrial combination were bringing about a dangerous
concentration of economic wealth in the United States.$ These conditions
have been summarized by the Supreme Court, as follows:
[The main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was
required by the economic condition of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the
enormous development of corporate organization, the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility
was being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been and4
would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.
Senator Sherman, in proposing legislation to cope with this accumulation of wealth, stated that "[t]hey had monopolies and mortmains of old,
0 Member of the New York Bar. BS., Princeton University, 1932; LL.B., Yale University, 1935.
1 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 17, 29, 33-34, 126-27 (W.
Ellis transl. 1947).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
3 See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 54 et seq. (1954).

4 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
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but never before such giants as in our day." 5 He stressed that such concentration of power placed in a few hands "a kingly prerogative" inconsistent
with our form of government which threatened to control not only individual markets but even state authorities in the United States, and said
that, if we in this country will not endure a king or an emperor, "we should
not submit to an autocrat of trade."6
Other congressional leaders, including those who eventually drafted
the final version of this legislation, concurred in the views of Senator
Sherman. While wishing to leave our economy in private hands, 7 they believed that excessive concentration of economic power had to be curtailed.
Eventually, therefore, they turned to certain well-known common-law principles which condemned both undue restraints and the monopolization of
trade, and decided to apply these principles to the trusts and combinations
which were thought increasingly to control our industries. Accordingly,
the Sherman Act was enacted for the purpose of declaring that any restraint
or monopolizing of interstate or foreign commerce, of a nature proscribed
by the common law, was thereafter to be a federal crime.
Broadly stated, this law prohibited, under severe penalties, every contract
or combination in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce, and every
monopolization or attempt to monopolize the same, and provided additional remedies, including suit in equity by the Federal Government, to
restrain such combinations, and action at law for triple damages by private
parties injured thereby. By this law, therefore, acts which at common law
were invalid, were made criminal offenses so far as they related to commerce among the States and with foreign nations, while special remedies
were established both at law and in equity.8
The 1890 curb placed by Congress upon concentration of wealth in
our economy, therefore, was essentially a federal fence located upon familiar
old common-law boundaries. It did not condemn size, bigness or even power
per se; but it did proscribe the use of unreasonable restraints or monopolization to achieve and/or exercise the same. In this manner, the law continued
in "one shape," with "custom perched" upon its fence posts to induce compliance with its statutory commands. Under its provisions, normal corporate
expansion, whether internal or external in form, might continue; but abnormal growth, achieved through unreasonable restraints or monopolization
of trade, was barred.
THE CLAYTON ACT

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 as enacted in 1914, placed a more limited
curb upon the concentration of wealth in interstate and foreign commerce.
521 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
821 CONG. Rac. 2457 (1890).
7 H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 226.
8J. DAvins, TRUST LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 10 (1915).

9 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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Its provisions were directed solely at growth by corporations through stock
acquisitions.
Early in the second decade of the present century, Congress became convinced that corporations were expanding through stock acquisitions at a rate which threatened to recreate, via the route of holding companies, the trusts and combinations previously condemned by Senator
Sherman. Accordingly, it decided to single out and prohibit any stock
acquisition by a corporation where a showing could be made that its effects
"may be" to bring about a Sherman Act violation. As explained in the
Senate Report recommending the enactment of this new legislation:
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices
which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not covered by the act of
July 2, 1890, or other existing antitrust acts, and thus, by making these
practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation. Among other of
these trade practices which are denounced and made unlawful may be
mentioned . . . holding companies ....10
Section 7 in its original form, however, was ineffective. As the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently reported, corporations merely continued their allegedly alarming rate of growth through the alternative
device of asset acquisitions. Indeed, the Commission claimed that through
this device, giant corporations were being formed which tended to become
private super-governments with the power to dominate - although not
necessarily to monopolize - both individual industries and the overall
economy. Accordingly, it recommended that "the rapid growth of private
super-government in industry must be halted."'"
The Commission explained that these corporate acquisitions of assets
were of three types: horizontal (between competitors), vertical (between
supplier and customer), and conglomerate (all others). In particular, it
claimed that conglomerate transactions were creating corporate giants possessing the power to destroy small business:
Perhaps the most important danger which is inherent in these conglomerate organizations is the economic power which they can wield
over a large number of different industries. Threatened with competition
in any one of its fields of enterprise, the conglomerate corporation may
sell below cost or may use other unfair methods in that field, absorbing
its losses through excessive profits made in its other lines of activity, all
There are few
rationalized in the name of "meeting competition....
greater dangers to small business today than the continued growth of
the conglomerate corporations.12
10 S.REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
11 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (FTC), REPORT ON THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE
MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONS

12

Id. at 13.

23 (1947).
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The Commission subsequently supplied detailed statistics in a series
of reports intended to document its contention that corporate growth
through asset acquisitions and mergers was bringing about an alarming
concentration, both in individual industries and in the economy as a whole,
"dominated by the over-all economic power of a small number of giant
corporations,"' 13 and recommended specifically that section 7 of the Clayton
Act be amended to apply a uniform legislative brake upon both stock and
asset acquisitions on the part of large corporations. The Commission was
convinced that there "must be some effective means of preventing giant
corporations from steadily increasing their power at the expense of small
business." 14
In short, a further boundary upon the concentration of wealth was
urged upon Congress. The Commission recognized, as did Newton, that
one can see further "by standing upon the shoulders of Giants"; but it insisted that such Giants should be self-made through internal growth, rather
than, as the Commission alleged, Frankenstein-fabricated by means of
mergers.
THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT

In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act' 5 amended section 7 of the Clayton
Act substantially in the manner recommended by the FTC. Its provisions
limit the acquisition by corporations of either the assets or the stock of
other corporations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Its provisions
are intended to apply to all types of such corporate acquisitions, namely,
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
Prior to the amendment, influential voices in Congress had been
echoing the contentions of the Commission that further concentration of
corporate control over our economy, whether arising from asset or stock
acquisitions, must be halted. Indeed, Senator O'Mahony, asserting that a
trend to this effect harbingered the socialization of industry, questioned
the sort of world in which we preferred to live. 16 Eventually, a majority in
Congress came to share in this alarmist point of view. For example, during
the Senate debate on the bill, Senator Aiken went so far as to urge passage
of the proposed legislation partly on the ground that "[t]he concentration
persons is a
of power, either economic or political, in the hands of a few
17
breeder of weakness, discontent, and, finally, revolution."'
The House and Senate Reports, in recommending the passage of the
proposed legislation, based their conclusions upon alleged findings that
"large" corporations had been increasing their size relative to small businesses in a manner to cause a high level of concentration both generally
18 FTC, REPORT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTIVE FAcILITIES 14 (1949).
14 FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT 69 (1948).

15 Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
iS Hearings on H.R. 2357 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945).
'796 CONG. REG. 16,503 (1950).
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"in the American economy" and specifically "in individual industries."18
The extent to which the American economy had purportedly become "concentrated and centralized in the hands of a few giant corporations" was
stressed.1 9 The stated purpose of the contemplated statute, accordingly, was
"to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting
from corporate mergers and acquisitions." 20
The House Report explained in some detail how the new Act was
intended to apply to mergers and acquisitions. Congress did not seek to
inhibit such external growth, even by large corporations, where no adverse
effect upon competition was threatened. Its provisions, rather, were "intended to permit intervention ... when the effect of an acquisition may be
a significant reduction in the vigor of competition." 21 The Act was to be
applied rigorously, however, whenever such external growth could be shown
to result (a) in a substantial increase in industrial concentration, (b) of a
nature as would, in turn, represent a substantial danger to vigorous competition in some market or markets. Illustrations of such proscribed mergers
and acquisitions were then listed:
[1] [Horizontal:] elimination in whole or in material part of the competitive activity of an enterprise which has been a substantial factor in
competition...
[2] [Vertical:] establishment of relationships between buyers and sellers
which deprive their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete ...
[3] [Conglomerate:] increase in the relative size of the enterprise making
the acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be decisive . .. .22
Charts illustrating the three types of mergers were then annexed, and
the statement was repeated that the "same principles" would apply equally
to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate transactions.2 3
The Report emphasized, in conclusion, that the proposed legislation
sought to prevent future acquisitions resulting in a substantial increase in
industrial concentration -where representing a substantial threat to vigorous competition - because of the fear of the attendant "concentration
24
of great economic power in a few corporations."
The additional 1950 boundary erected by Congress, it follows, again
restricts, although it does not prohibit, all future growth by large companies
through acquisitions and mergers. Economists may reason from statistical
analyses that such a statute erects too high or too low a barrier to this form
of external growth.2 5 In approaching antitrust, however, the "heart has its
18 H.R.

REr. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1949).
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).

19 S. REP.
20 Id.

21H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8.
Id.
23 Id. at 11.
22

241d. at 13.
25 Compare 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLIcY, 115 CONG.
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reasons which reason knows nothing of." Concentration of wealth in our
large corporations may seem modest to some minds when measured by the
percent shared by these corporations in our expanding national economy;
but it may simultaneously appear hazardous to some hearts when magnified
by the power of these giant concerns over smaller competitors struggling to
share in this economy. In any event, in the United States, as in Athens,
those who decide may be "fools" and those who discuss may be "wise";
but it is the former and not the latter who "decide."
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The legislative intent of Congress in enacting our antitrust laws, in the
manner described herein, may or may not have been effectuated in the precise phrases of the resulting prohibitory provisions. Indeed, there are many
who claim that, though the legislative spirit was willing, the statutory flesh
was weak. Should it be assumed that the will of Congress has been sufficiently
reflected in its words, however, the following conclusions are necessarily
reached with respect to the application of these laws to corporate mergers
and acquisitions.
First: Any horizontal acquisition or merger whereby a large, viable
company acquires a substantial, viable competitor, or a series of small
26
companies representing the equivalent of a substantial, viable company, is
prohibited. This conclusion is reached because, on the one hand, it reduces
to a substantial degree the available competition and, on the other, increases
the share of the market held by the survivor. Thus, and to this extent,
industrial concentration is increased in the market in which the parties had
previously been competing.
Second: Any vertical acquisition or merger whereby a large, viable
company acquires a substantial, viable supplier or customer, or a series of
small companies representing the equivalent of a substantial viable customer,27 is also proscribed. This result is reached because it deprives their
rivals of a fair opportunity to compete in a substantial share of the market,
and increases the aggregate assets of the surviving company in comparison
with those of its competitors. Here, industrial concentration is again, and
to this degree, increased in the line of commerce in which the parties formerly had been engaged.
Third: Any conglomerate acquisition or merger whereby a large company goes beyond a transaction which has a neutral effect upon competition
as, for example, mere diversification or an investment in another industry,
and instead obtains an advantage which threatens to be decisive over competitors of the acquiring or acquired company, is likewise forbidden. This
reasoning is based upon the fact that a transaction which gives to the surREc. 5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969) with 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORcE REPORT ON PRODUcTIvrrY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG. Rxc. 6472 (daily ed. June 12, 1969).
28 H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8; S. RrP. No. 1775, at 5.
27 Id.
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viving company a significant increase in economic power to restrain or to
monopolize trade in one or more of the markets or lines of commerce in
which it competes, likewise represents a substantial threat to a free, competitive economy. It would seem to be irrelevant that this increased concentration of power, if it could be exercised, is or is not in fact exercised.
It should again be stressed, however, that the legislative intent in imposing curbs upon corporate acquisitions and mergers was to curtail only
transactions "that are economically significant. '28 Thus, small companies,
"which cannot produce the specified effect upon competition," were to be
free to merge.2 9 Again, failing companies were to be "allowed to sell" even
to a competitor.3 0 With all due humility, it is submitted that Capitol Hill
had no intent to proscribe any de minimis acquisition -such as a merger
between a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic and a wholesaler
of processed food - where no significant increase in industrial concentration
31
results, and any alleged increase in economic power is shown to be illusory.
The reader must now consult other sources for analyses of the legislative language, their judicial interpretation, and the application of each
to specific acquisitions and mergers. This paper does not purport to consider anything beyond the intent of Congress in enacting these laws. It is
respectfully suggested, however, that the reader might take with him his
knowledge of the historical background of these statutes to guide his steps
as he proceeds in further research. Bench and bar can best approach the
words of the statutes by viewing them as "mere counters," useful only in
making their "reckonings," but having no value as legal currency independent of the light thrown upon them by their history.
A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic.
S. RnP. No. 1775, at 5.
29 H.R. RF,. No. 1191, at 8.
Sold. at 6;S. Rn'. No. 1775, at 7.
31 See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 600 (1965).
28

